GPS Tracking and the Fourth Amendment: The New Frontier in Counterterrorism Efforts by Rozencranc, German
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
2012
GPS Tracking and the Fourth Amendment: The
New Frontier in Counterterrorism Efforts
German Rozencranc
Seton Hall Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons
Recommended Citation
Rozencranc, German, "GPS Tracking and the Fourth Amendment: The New Frontier in Counterterrorism Efforts" (2012). Law School
Student Scholarship. 11.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/11
GPS Tracking and the Fourth Amendment: The New Frontier in Counterterrorism Efforts  
German Rozencranc  
 
I. Introduction  
The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari and heard oral arguments 
concerning the warrantless use of GPS devices for suspect-tracking purposes.1  The Court’s 
ultimate decision will help resolve an existing circuit split as to the legality of such a law 
enforcement practice. 2  In making this decision, the Court is certain to weigh the framework of 
the Fourth Amendment and utilize the reasonableness assessment that dominated search and 
seizure jurisprudence.   In particular, the Court will deal with the parameters established in 
United States v. Knotts,3 which held that warrantless beeper monitoring is permissible, and 
United States v. Kyllo,4 which limited law enforcement ability to use infra-device to scan a home 
for narcotic-growing machinery.   
It is the position of this paper that warrantless GPS tracking can be rationalized through 
the “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.   Using the United 
States v. Berger two-step assessment, it is clear that in the wake of September 11, 2001, GPS 
tracking is necessary for national security and counterterrorism efforts.   Moreover, the practice 
is made permissible through an existing statutory scheme, the Uniting and Strengthening 
                                                                 
1
 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted   United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 
(2011). 
2
 See infra Section II, part 1.   
3
 United States v. Knotts , 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
4
 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act. 5  
Finally, the capability to use GPS tracking data for suspect profile creation has become an 
indispensible tool for achieving a compelling government interest, the halting of terroristic 
threats.    
This paper begins by briefly discussing the framework behind the creation of the Fourth 
Amendment, the rise of the United States v. Katz’s general expectation test, and the degree of 
privacy that vehicles have obtained in Fourth Amendment case law.   Using this background, the 
second part of this paper deconstructs the present circuit split utilizing the Berger framework.   It 
rationalizes the use of GPS tracking through the “special needs” exception by showing that the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in a compelling governmental interest of 
ensuring domestic safety.  Moreover, I argue that there is an existing statutory scheme for 
permitting such practices and that warrantless GPS tracking is necessary to further this 
regulatory scheme.   I conclude by discussing the implication of this decision and concerns that 
warrantless GPS tracking could translate to abuse and eventually lead to cell phone tracking.     
II. The Fourth Amendment and the Rise of the General Expectation Test 
The Fourth Amendment was the product of early American inhabitants’ dual concern 
over the privacy of their home and papers against the government and fear of unbridled official 
power and discretion.6   The Fourth Amendment embodied the Founder’s trepidation of general 
warrants and writs of assistance as indicated by several pre-constitutional search and seizure 
                                                                 
5
 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (“USA PATRIOT”) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered titles of 
U.S.C.).  
6
 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological 
Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325 (2002).  
cases including: Wilkes v. Wood7, Entick v. Carrington8, and the Writs of Assistance Case.9  
Embodying the framers’ concerns over unbridled executive authority, the Fourth Amendment 
became a staple against intrusion.10   
 Based on the need to protect the “people” from unrestrained governmental intrusion, the 
Fourth Amendment stands as a compromise; allowing a right to security for citizens and a 
restrained governmental authority to maintain order.   The text of the amendment reads: “The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or things to go be seized.” 11 The first clause has been interpreted to provide a 
comprehensive right of citizens to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.12  The 
second clause refers to the issuance of warrants and has a specific purpose of regulating warrant 
authority.13  Its effects have been to ban the use of general warrants and mandate a distinct level 
of specificity prior to the issuance of any such warrant.14 
                                                                 
7
 19 Howell's State Trials 1153 (K.B. 1763).  This case involved Wilkes, a critic of King George II who was 
awarded damages by Lord Camden after the King’s henchmen broke into Wilkes’ home and rummaged through is 
personal papers.  
8
 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (K.B. 1765).  This case involved the King’s messengers, who broke into the home of 
John Entick, a writer, seized his personal papers and eventually arrested him. The messengers were acting p ursuant 
to a search authorization of the Secretary of State for the Northern Department. The Court held that the search was 
neither authorized by statute or precedent and, therefore, was impressible.  Led to the principle that the Government 
may not act unless explicitly authorized by the law. Cuddihy, William; Hardy, B. Carmon (1980). "A Man's House 
Was Not His Castle: Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution". William and Mary 
Quarterly (Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture) 37 (3): 372–400.   
9
 See M.H. Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case (1978).  This case involved a challenge of 63 merchants to British 
customs officers’ authority to conduct general searches smuggled goods without particular authorization.  
10
 Ku, supra 1, at 1332-133.  
11
 U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
12
 Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering The Original Fourth Amendment , 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 557–58 (1999).  
13
 Id. 
14
 Id.  
 The United States Supreme Court has infused Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with an 
emphasis on reasonableness.15  Searching for a tool by which to analyze Fourth Amendment 
challenges, the Supreme Court developed the “reasonable expectation” test in Katz v. United 
States. 16  In particular, the Court held that Fourth Amendment protection applies only in settings 
where there is a subjective expectation of privacy that is exhibited and where the expectation of 
privacy is objectively reasonable to society.17  One’s home is rightfully within a zone of 
protection as a homeowner expects a degree of privacy from intrusion and, correspondingly, 
society embraces this expectation as being reasonable.   Pursuant to this decision, Fourth 
Amendment protection has been gauged based on an individual’s expectation of privacy and, 
subsequently, the degree of reasonableness to which society embraces said expectation.   This 
analysis led to the rise of different zones of privacy with the most protection given to a person’s 
body18, followed by a person’s home19 and its curtilage20, and a severely diminished expectation 
within the public sphere.21  While some challenge the use of a reasonableness assessment,22 it is 
undisputed that, presently, any future decision concerning the Fourth Amendment must endure 
                                                                 
15
 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting “the first principle that the 
‘reasonableness’ requirement of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection that the common law afforded”); 
Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (“As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the 
ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a government search is ‘reasonableness.’”); Whren v. United States , 517 
U.S. 806, 817 (1996) (“It is of course true that in principle every Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon a 
‘reasonableness’ determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors.”) 
16
 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 276 (1960).  
17
 Id. at 361.  
18
 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004)(finding that a search of a person’s body deserves a 
higher degree of scrutiny and level of suspicion on the part of the searching parties).  
19
 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).  
20
 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).   
21
 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (discussing that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
public sphere).  
22
 Lee, Cynthia, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness  Analysis, GWU Law 
School Public Law Research Paper No. 576; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 576. (concern that Implicit 
bias may also lead courts to exercise their discretion to decide whether a search is reasonable in ways that favor law 
enforcement and disfavor Blacks and Latinos who make up the bulk of individuals arrested, tried, and convicted of 
crimes in the United States).  
reasonableness scrutiny: gauging a subjective expectation of privacy with society’s willingness 
to embrace it.   
i. Vehicles and the Law: Understanding the Present Split. 
The motor vehicle has been afforded only limited Fourth Amendment protection due to 
diminished expectation of privacy one has in their automobile.23  Since Chadwick v. United 
States, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that car owners, passengers, and 
operators are entitled to a reduced degree of expectation of privacy in their motor vehicles.24  
The Court explicitly notes that “[O]ne has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle 
because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository 
of personal effects…. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents 
are in plain view."25  The Court rationalized that automobiles are operated on the open highway 
and are consistently subject to plain view intrusion.26  Moreover, cars must be licensed which 
encompasses a highly regulated operations including a myriad of rules.27  Finally, automobiles 
are required to periodically undergo official inspections and are even taken into police custody in 
the interest of public safety.28  Combined, these factors amount to a reduced expectation of 
privacy that permits leeway in automobile searches and seizures.  
                                                                 
23
 Chadwick, infra 19.  
24
 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1977)(reaffirming the Carroll Doctrine’s automobile expectations 
with the added rationale that in addition to a car’s mobility, a reduced expectation of privacy permits the search of a 
car upon the finding of probable cause that the car contained contraband and that it not practicable to obtain a 
warrant).  
25
 Id. at 12 (citing Cardwell v. Lewis , 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)). 
26
 Id.  
27
 Id.  
28
 Id.  
 In a seminal case concerning automotive tracking, the Court upheld the use of a beeper 
device for tracking purposes in a drug related investigation.29  The beeper apparatus emitted 
signals that could be picked up by a radio receiver inside a container of Chloroform.30  In United 
States v. Knotts, officers followed Knotts after his purchase of Chloroform, using visual 
surveillance and radio signal tracking, eventually leading to the finding of a drug lab.31    
Confronted with this advance in technology coupled with the reduced expectation of privacy in 
cars, the Court held that monitoring beeper signals did not violate any legitimate expectation of 
privacy.32  The Court explained that tracking a beeper is akin to the following of an automobile 
on public streets and that there is no expectation of privacy of having a car observed arriving on 
one’s premises after leaving a public highway.33  Relying on Knotts, lower courts have condoned 
law enforcement officers’ use of tracking devices without prior warrant authorization.  The 
decision, however, was not without flaws as indicated by Justice Brennan’s concurrence 
expressing concern that had the defendant challenged not merely certain aspect of the monitoring 
of the beeper but also the original installation, the Court would have had a much more difficult 
time addressing the matter.34  
The Court expanded on the degree to which technology may be utilized without a 
warrant.  Nearly 20 years following Knotts, the Court decided Kyllo v. United States which 
involved the use of a heat seeking device officers utilized to scan a home for heat lamps 
commonly used to grow marijuana.3536  The Court held there is a minimal expectation of privacy 
                                                                 
29
 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).  
30
 Id.  
31
 Id. at 279.  
32
 Id. at 282.  
33
 Id.  
34
 Id. at 286–87 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
35
 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).  
36
 Id. at 29.  
that protects against the use of sense enhancing technology to obtain information regarding the 
anterior of a home that “could not otherwise be obtained without physical intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area.”37  While visual observation is normally not a search at all, here, 
the technological advent permits a breach of the home and, therefore, a search took place and a 
warrant is required.38  The Court based its decision on two major premises: first, the home is 
entitled to special protection and, second, the technology in question was not in general public 
use.39 
The Circuit courts were left to reconcile these two decisions in the context of Global 
Position System (Hereinafter “GPS”) surveillance.  GPS tracking involves the use of a device 
that is attached to the exterior of a car which omits a signal and is subject to continuous 
monitoring and data collection.40  A GPS has three main components including a network of 
satellites that transmits ranging signals, a control segment maintaining GPS through a system of 
ground- monitor stations and satellite upload facilities, and user-receivers that process signals of 
at least four of these satellites.41  The GPS device uses the signaled information to 
mathematically determine the receiver’s location, velocity, and time in a process known as 
trilateration.42  
While GPS tracking was originally developed in the early 1970s by the United States 
Department of Defense, the technology has since been utilized on a large mass scale.43  With 
wide usage, the number of GPS satellites has additionally increased from the original twenty-
                                                                 
37
 Id. at 32.  
38
 Id.  
39
 Id.  
40
 Elliott Kaplan and Christopher Hegarty, Understanding GPS: Principles and  Applications, (2nd ed. 2006).  
41
 Adam Koppel, Warranting a Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns Raised by Law Enforcement's Warrantless 
Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV.1061, 1063–64 (2010).  
42
 Id.  
43
 Ahmed El-Rabbany, Introduction to GPS: The Global Positioning System 1 (1st ed. 2002). 
four in 1994 to the present thirty satellite system, thereby permitting greater operability and 
accuracy.44  Currently, a basic receiver can accurately determine its position within a few 
meters.45  A more advanced GPS system is able to utilize differential data to improve its positing 
accuracy to within centimeters.46  Moreover, weather conditions do not affects GPS monitoring, 
thereby truly permitting continuous positioning and timing information.47  Technological 
advances in GPS machinery made its data output all the more accurate and continuous, leading to 
great advances within the public and reliance by police officers for surveillance purposes.    
In its signal emitting capacity, GPS tracking is akin to the beeper tracking that was found 
permissible in Knotts. 48  GPS tracking generally take place outside the scope of the home and is 
a technology that is presently in widespread public use.   These aforementioned factors 
distinguish GPS tracking from the infra-thermal context that Kyllo confronted, yet, the Supreme 
Court has not tackled the decision directly.49  GPS tracking, however, presents an additional 
privacy intrusion given its record-keeping function.  With continuous data output, officers may 
deduct a pattern of behavior and insight into a person’s private movements that is not available 
with either visual or beeper tracking.50  This led to much confusion amongst the Circuits leaving 
the matter highly disputed and subject to different interpretations.   
Each circuit has handled this issue somewhat differently, yet two schools of thought have 
eventually emerged.  The majority of the circuit courts side with a permissive interpretation of 
                                                                 
44
 Id., supra 25.  
45
 Id.  
46
 Id.  
47
 Id. 
48
 Katz, supra 16.  
49
 Oliver, Supra  21.  
50
 Berry, Supra 66.  
Knotts51 allowing police officers to track potential suspects without probable cause or the 
procurement of warrants.52  The minority is represented by the D.C. circuit which requires a 
showing of probable cause and warrant authorization prior to GPS tracking.53  Courts, however, 
have differed on what showing is necessary prior to police officer’s use of tracking devices.  The 
1st Circuit, prior to Knotts indicated a hesitation to permit tracking in the context of beepers 
installed without a warrant.54  The court stated that officers should have some evidentiary 
support prior to tracking.55  In that case, the officers had probable cause to utilize the tracking 
machinery, yet, the court added that a lesser standard would have sufficed.56  While eventually 
the 1st Circuit defaults to Knotts, it did not explicitly abandon its requirement that office 
engaging in surveillance have some basis in fact prior to such monitoring.57  This default 
approach has been embraced by the 2nd58 and 3rd59 circuits as well, all of which indicate that 
groundless tracking is not permitted and some evidentiary basis is required.    
The 5th and 8th Circuits have required that officers have reasonable suspicion prior to 
monitoring suspects with GPS tracking.  This intermediary standard requires that officers have 
some reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is taking place and invasive surveillance is, 
                                                                 
51
 Kyllo, Supra 19.  
52
 See generally United States v. Sparks, 755 F. Supp. 2d 384 (2010); Morton v. Nassau County Police Dep’t, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87558 (E.D.N.Y.  Nov. 27, 2007); United States v. Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D.M.D. 2004); 
United States v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Walker,  771 F.Supp. 2d 803 (2011); 
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th  Cir. 2010); 
United States v. McIvar, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 
2010).  
53
 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
54
 United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977).  
55
 Id.  
56
 Id. at 111.  
57
 United States v. Sparks, 755 F.Supp.2d 384 (2010).  
58
 Morton v. Nassau County Police Dep’t, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87558 (E.D.N.Y.  Nov. 27, 2007) (holding that 
following Knotts, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s movements on public ways, and there was 
no search or seizure by the placement of a GPS to a vehicle based upon previous sighting of residential burglaries).  
59
  United States  v. Hosbbach, 518 F.Supp. 759 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that prior judicial authorization is 
unnecessary to a bumper beeper installation). 
therefore, necessary.   Pre Knotts, the 5th Circuit explicitly held that the warrantless attachment 
of an electric device to the exterior of a suspect’s vehicle, based upon reasonable suspicion, was 
permissible.60 Similarly, the 8th Circuit indicated that when police have “reasonable suspicion” 
that a specific vehicle is transporting drugs; a warrant is not required to install “non-invasive” 
GPS tracking for a “reasonable period of time.”61  While both circuits defaulted to a Knotts type 
analysis,62 neither court has explicitly abandoned its intermediary standard of investigation.  The 
6th Circuit was swayed by Knotts and the 8th Circuit’s decision in Marquez. 63 Pre-Knotts, The 
6th circuit held that a request for beeper tracking was unreasonable when it did not explicitly 
specify a time limitation.64 The court later sided with the 8th Circuit in holding that attaching a 
tracking device based on police’s reasonable suspicion that a vehicle is transporting drugs is 
permissible and is not a search.65 The 4th Circuit has indicated some concern about applying a 
Knotts-beeper type analysis to the GPS context.66  The Court detailed the difference between a 
beeper that merely helps the police stay in contact with the vehicle that they are actively 
monitoring as opposed to a GPS system that wholly substitutes police surveillance.67  Moreover, 
the recording of GPS information could amount to severe intrusion and the court indicated that 
Supreme Court could opt for a warrant requirement based on the degree of intrusion.68 
                                                                 
60
 United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1981). 
61
 United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010). 
62
 Id.; United States v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that GPS tracking tagged to the 
undercarriage of the defendant’s brother vehicle was permissible because public streets scan never fall within a 
home’s curtilage and defendant’s expectation of privacy is substantially reduced in a vehicle parked in plain view in 
a public place).  
63
 Marquez, supra 49.  
64
 United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 945 (6th Cir. 1980).  
65
 United States v. Walker, 771 F.Supp.2d 803 (2011).  
66
 United States v. Berry, 300 F.Supp.2d 366 (2004).  
67
 Id.  
68
 Id.  
The 7th and 9th69 circuits have both held hat GPS tracking is not a search and, therefore, 
no warrant is necessary. The 7th Circuit explicitly held that there is no search or seizure under 
the 4th amendment when police attaches a GPS to a vehicle that: 1) does not draw power from 
the car’s engine or battery;  2) does not take up room occupied by passengers or packages; or 3) 
does not alter the vehicle’s appearance.70 The court there analogized GPS tracking to the use of 
surveillance cameras and satellites images, neither of which is considered a search in the Fourth 
Amendment context.71   The 9th Circuit emphasized the diminished expectation one has in the 
undercarriage of a vehicle, where GPS tracking devices are traditionally placed, and ultimately 
concluded that any such installation does not amount to a search.72   
Conversely, the D. C. Circuit has recently decided United States v. Maynard, wherein it 
held that the continuous GPS monitoring of a suspect for a period of a month was 
impermissible.73  Recognizing that prolonged monitoring yields a highly detailed profile of 
where a person travels, their association, including political, religious, and personal relationships, 
the court decided that such tracking amounted to a search.74 The court emphasized that an 
ordinary person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements, especially within 
the course of a month.75  The Court eventually held that Knotts did not govern cases such as 
these and that police officers offended defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy by tracking 
his movement continuously.76  Maynard contradicts the argument that GPS tracking is akin to a 
                                                                 
69
 Sparks Infra 57; Hosbach, infra 59.  
70
 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007).  
71
 Id.  
72
 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. McIvar, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 
1999).  
73
 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
74
 Id. at 562.   
75
 Id. at 559.  
76
 Id. at 549, 564.  
visual surveillance because of the accuracy and degree to which the information is obtained.77  
GPS tracking presents an additional, more invasive facet, in its information capacity, eventually 
amounting to a movement profile.  In the Maynard case, this movement profile served as the 
primary basis for finding that the defendant was involved in a drug dealing conspiracy.78 The 
United State Supreme Court has recently granted certification to hear the case and conclusively 
resolve this dispute.79  The “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement could provide 
the basis for the Court’s decision that GPS tracking should be permitted as a warrantless practice.    
III. Analysis: Rationalizing GPS Tracking Through The Special needs 
Exception  
 
The Supreme Court has developed a series of exceptions to the stringent warrant 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment on the basis of many mitigating circumstances.80  
Among these is the “special need” exception wherein if the government search or seizure is 
designed to effectuate a special need beyond criminal enforcement, the Fourth Amendment 
analysis shifts from a probable cause inquiry to a balancing of interests.81  With a lesser standard 
than probable cause, courts weigh the need for the search pursuant to the governmental interest 
and existing statutory scheme versus the degree of invasion into a person’s right to privacy.82 
Largely favoring a reasonable suspicion standard, courts have gone so far as to permit area 
                                                                 
77
 Id.  
78
 Id.  
79
 United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011)[oral argument Nov. 8].  
80
 See generally The Hot Pursuit Doctrine: Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Consent: Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Plain View Doctrine- Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987); Motor Vehicle 
Exception: Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). See also Mascolo, 
Edward, Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFF. L. 
REV. 419 (1972-1973). 
81
 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656  (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 
U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (holding that  an exception applies when a search serves "special government needs" beyond 
the normal needs of law enforcement; in which case, the search may be reasonable despite the absence of a warrant,  
probable cause, or even individualized suspicion).  
82
 Id.  
warrants, safety inspections, 83 and administrative searches of commercial84 and non-commercial 
structures.   More recently, the Supreme Court expanded warrantless searches, based on 
reasonable suspicion, in a school setting.85  The Court upheld the search of a student’s purse for 
cigarettes by reasoning that the search effectuated the state’s need to assure a safe and healthy 
learning environment.86 Reasonable suspicion has since been upheld as a sufficient standard for 
protecting citizens’ diminished expectation of privacy in schools87, employment88, and 
governmental posts.89   This expansion indicates a judicial willingness to embrace alternatives to 
the probable cause standard and an inclination to allow the government to effectuate social 
policies with invasive means.  Such rationalization could permit sufficient justification for GPS 
tracking in the wake of 9/11 and increased compromising of Fourth Amendment protection on 
national safety grounds.   We, therefore, proceed to examine the reasonableness of GPS tracking 
through a two step analysis as enunciated the by the Supreme Court in New York v. Burger. 90 
There, the Supreme Court held that searches pursuant to the “special need” exception must be the 
product of a substantial governmental interest that informs the regulatory scheme that permits 
warrantless searches.91  In this step, the analysis turns on finding a compelling governmental 
interest and an existing statutory scheme.  Secondly, the warrantless inspection must be 
necessary to further the regulatory scheme and provide for a constitutionally adequate substitute 
                                                                 
83
 Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).  
84
 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).  
85
 New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325 (1985).  
86
 Id.  
87
 Id.  
88
 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).  See also City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 
2619 (2010) (holding that where an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an employer’s intrusion on that 
expectation ‘‘for non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as  for investigations of work-related misconduct, 
should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstance).  
89
 Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656  (1989.  
90
 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). The Court in Burger actually divided the reasonableness analysis to a 
3-prong inquiry. Here, we coupled the second and third prongs for brevity purposes and similarity in arguments for 
sufficing them both in this context.  
91
 Id. at 702. 
for a warrant.92  GPS tracking fulfills both prongs given the nature of present day national 
security and sufficient statutory safeguards at tailoring its use. 
 
   
i. September 11’s Impact on Fourth Amendment Landscape and the Creation 
of a Compelling Governmental Interest  
 
Prior to the September 11 attack, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the 
government’s special need to protect its citizens from outside threats.  As such, suspicionless 
safety searches in airports, subways, and public buildings have been unfailingly upheld in nearly 
every court.93 This was always the case in the context of national border searches wherein courts 
have upheld the government’s need to regulate and protect the entry points.94 Derived from the 
government’s sovereign right to stop and examine persons and property crossing into the 
country, border searches allow officials a means to inspect incoming individuals and their 
belongings without having to obtain a warrant.95  This exception has been expanded to include 
searches of areas that the government and reviewing courts found to be the functional equivalent 
of an international border.96  This expansion allows officials to conduct “border searches” even 
in situations where it is not feasible to conduct the search at the actual point of entry. 9798 
                                                                 
92
 Id. 
93
 See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (1973) (holding that airport screenings are considered to be 
administrative searches because they are conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme, where the essential 
administrative purpose is to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft.); Comm. On  
Commercial  Aviation  Sec. Et Al., Airline  Passenger  Security  Screening: New Technologies And Implementation 
Issues 1, 6 (1996). 
94
 Kim, Yule, Protecting the U.S. Perimeter: Border Searches Under the Fourth Amendment, CRS Report for 
Congress (2009). 
95
 Id. at 1.  
96
 Id.  
97
 Id.  
Confronted with flat geographical designations of border-types areas has resulted in much 
confusion about the type of stop officers are conducting when searching parties within those 
areas.99   
In a juncture between border searches and vehicles, the Supreme Court found that the 
dignity and privacy interests that require reasonable suspicion for highly intrusive searches of a 
person do not apply to vehicles being examined at the border. 100101  In Flores-Montano, custom 
officials disassembled the gas tank of a vehicle crossing the border only to find 37 kilograms of 
marijuana.102  The Court explained that in light of the need to stem the flow of drugs, the 
government is entitled certain liberties necessary to effectuate its main goal of protecting 
territorial integrity and its people’s safety.103  In this interpretive vein, lower courts have found 
that drilling a hole into personal property such a container or a vehicle to explore its interior 
made the search non-routine but yet still may be permissible given lenient standards. 104   In 
United States v. Arnold, the 9th Circuit has even permitted the search of laptops in the course of 
a routine border search. 105 Finding that the Supreme Court has only explicitly limited border 
searches to “intrusive searches of the person” and searches resulting in “exceptional damage to 
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property[,]" the court concluded that laptop searches, like car searches, do not trigger a higher 
standard beyond reasonable suspicion.106  
The attack of September 11, 2001, has molded a new phase in American geo-political and 
legal spheres.   Historians, politicians, and legal scholars have uniformly pronounced that 
September 11 marks a transition in American history with significant consequences in nearly 
every level of government.107  In the context of the Fourth Amendment, suspicionless searches at 
airports and other public places have become more intrusive with advances in technology and 
judicial leeway permitting for more intrusion.108  In fact, lower courts have uniformly upheld 
more intrusive searches as falling within the scope of the “special need” exception.109  A striking 
example of this expansion has been the 2nd Circuit’s decision upholding a New York City 
program that called for daily inspection checkpoints at selected subway stations.110  The Court 
held that prevention of terrorism is a “special need” that is both immediate and substantial given 
the threat of terrorism.111  Moreover, searches were minimally intrusive, lasting only a few 
seconds and people are able to decline and proceed to find alternative means of transportation.112  
The Court has even gone so far as to indicate that the program’s level of effectiveness is not 
subject to judicial review but rather simply its purpose.113  This implies that an intrusive program 
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can be found wholly unworkable and yet be upheld in the courts based on the special need 
exception.  This heightened discretionary standard is akin to judicial leeway in extreme historical 
cases, such as the State of Emergency exception, and by extension could apply to GPS 
tracking.114  
Turning to the first prong of Berger, in the wake of September 9/11, grave concern over 
national security could justify the need to use GPS tracking as a key police instrument.  National 
threats in the form of terrorism have gained their heightened risk standing because of the use of 
highly technological, covert, and unconventional warfare methodology.115 National security 
experts estimate that terrorist factions could very likely reside within the United States leaving 
police officers with the responsibility to discover these groups and neutralize them.116 A more 
permissive approach to police handling of terrorism threats should, therefore, be permitted.   
Case law has embraced the dual role of police officers serving as law enforcement 
officials and counterterrorism units.   The Supreme Court in Burger held that the administrative 
nature of inspections is not negated simply because the inspectors were law enforcement 
officials.117  In fact, police officer’s existing security based infrastructure helps to make 
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counterterrorism efforts more efficient.118  Some of the many strengths include: ability to 
conduct covert intelligence, disruption and dismantling of plots, risk analysis, target hardening, 
community mobilization, protection of persons and infrastructure, emergency assistance after 
attacks, order-maintenance during and after attacks, mitigation of damage, and criminal 
investigation of incidents. 119 State and Federal bodies, in enacting post 9/11 responses, have 
emphasized the benefits of police force utilization for counterterrorism purposes.120  This is 
especially evident by the creation of New York City’s Counterterrorism Bureau. 121 Noting that 
New York City has experienced first-hand the threat of international terrorism, the New York 
City Police Department Counterterrorism Bureau was formed allowing for a city-wide operation 
to assist in the prevention of terrorist threats. 122  The NYPD has increased its anti-terrorism 
division from 17 to 125 detectives and supervisors, and works with FBI agents on terrorism 
investigation.123  
The nature and importance of national security coupled with the need to use police 
officers for counterterrorism purposes amounts to a significant governmental interest that would 
justify more invasive surveillance methodology.  It is undisputed that the Government has a 
tremendous interest in protecting its people from existing threats and would, therefore, condone 
use of technological innovation for efficiency purposes.  GPS tracking is a crucial adjunct to 
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counterterrorism surveillance efforts, amounting to a substantial governmental interest in 
promoting its use in a variety of police oriented tasks.   
 
 
ii. Existing Statutory Scheme  and the No Alternative Route   
Having established a compelling governmental interest in the use of GPS tracking for 
police counterterrorism efforts, such use must be pursuant to an established statutory scheme.124 
The Court has repeatedly held that unbridled police discretion would not be permitted and a 
statutory scheme is, therefore, necessary to regulate police conduct. 125 In an immediate response 
to the 9/11 attack, Congress enacted the Uniting an Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (hereinafter “Patriot 
Act”).126  The Act codified a federal case law trend that broadly interpreted the Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure provisions.127  The Patriot Act, accordingly, moved further away 
from the probable cause standard.  The Patriot Act reduces restrictions on law enforcement 
agencies seeking to search telephone, email communicational, financial and medical records, and 
generally investigate suspects.128  In particular, Section 213 and 218 have created tremendous 
amount of uproar in expanding the authority for surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act and condoning “sneak and peek” authority, allowing agents executing search 
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warrants to delay telling the targets that their property has been searched or seized. 129  Section 
218 particularly expanded the government’s authority to use FISA warrants to conduct electronic 
surveillance instead of proceeding under the demanding standard of Title II which cover criminal 
investigation.130  These expansions circumvent Fourth Amendment safeguards by legislative 
means that omit governmental action from judicial review at its inception.  While subsequent 
judicial review is feasible, the Government and judicial interpretation of the Act indicate that this 
statutory scheme succumbs to governmental deference at the cost of greater protection of Fourth 
Amendment provisions.   
More relevant to the GPS analysis is the Patriot Act’s expansion of the definition of 
terrorism to include domestic terrorism.131 Specifically, the Act defines the term “domestic 
terrorism” to include any activities that involve “acts dangerous to human life that are a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state.” 132 This wording amounts to a 
grounds for which law enforcement bodies may utilize GPS tracking for criminal investigation 
purposes under the guise of terrorism prevention.   Regarding the level of suspicion necessary for 
the police to have before engaging in GPS tracking, the Act simply requires that suspected 
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activities “appear to be intended- (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence 
the police of a government by intimidation or coercion; or  (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
government[.]”133 The “appear to be intended” standard is much less than the probable cause 
requirement that is necessary to obtain a warrant and indicates the permissive nature of 
counterterrorism practices.  
Recognizing that terrorism could emerge from within the United States, the Act also 
includes the “Lone Wolf” provision134 which allows intelligence investigations of terrorist 
suspects not connected to a foreign nation or organization.  A broad reading of this provision 
gives nearly unrestricted discretion for police officers to investigate citizens without having to 
prove that they belong to a foreign terrorist organization.135 GPS tracking, therefore, is likely 
permissible within the scope of the Patriot Act, allowing for greater data retention, at minimal 
cost, of these suspected individuals.  The regulatory scheme here is non-discriminatory and 
invasion is minimal when compared to some of the more draconian allowances the Act permits 
including the “sneak and peek” scenarios.  Police usage of GPS tracking, therefore, would be 
considered highly regulated endeavor that is pursuant to a statutory scheme that aims to 
minimize national and domestic threats.  The fact that police officers have some discretion as to 
who they investigate does not undermine the non-discriminatory end of GPS tracking.  The 
Supreme Court has conclusively noted that police discretion is permissible so long as the 
discretion is exercised according to standard criteria on the basis of something other than 
suspicion of criminal activity.136 Here, police investigation would be pursuant to the Patriot Act’s 
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definition of domestic terrorism which permits law enforcement permissible discretion to 
classify parties as such without a reviewing intermediary body.   
In general, “special needs” based exceptions are subject to the limitation that once a 
regulation is primarily used for crime prevention or evidence gathering instead of some other 
compelling governmental interest, such exception becomes inapplicable and general Fourth 
Amendment standards apply. 137 Regulations with a dual purpose of promoting a governmental 
interest and assisting in crime prevention, however, have repeatedly been found permissible so 
long as the governmental interest is the primary reason for the practice.  In fact, a secondary 
purpose of crime prevention has generally been permitted in the context of “special need” 
exceptions.138  In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court explicitly noted that a secondary 
criminal prevention purpose is permissible so long as the regulation’s primary purpose is “non-
law enforcement” related.139  The fact that GPS tracking would serve substantial criminal 
evidence gathering function would not invalidate it as the primary function is nonetheless 
attributed to national safety efforts.  With a primary non-law enforcement related purpose, the 
Patriot Act has permitted the Government to no longer differentiate between information 
gathered for criminal purposes and surveillance for the purpose of gathering foreign 
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intelligence.140  In so permitting, the Patriot Act circumvents previous judicial safeguards that 
mandated stricter standards for criminal based investigation and enforcement.141 
Turning to the second prong, warrantless inspection must be necessary to further the 
regulatory scheme.  In enacting the Patriot Act, Congress related the urgency with which national 
threats must be addressed, therein permitting for a circumvention of the Fourth Amendment 
regulations.  The preamble to the Act alone indicates that the purpose of the legislation involves 
national safety interests that cannot be sufficed but for the statutory tools the Acts now 
permits.142  While the Act does explicitly name some of these warrantless tools including 
authority to intercept wire, oral, and communication; it additionally allows the enforcing agents 
leeway in choosing appropriate methodology by which to carry on the purpose of the Act.143  As 
such, police may turn to the GPS tracking as a distinctly effective surveillance method.   
The use of surveillance, for national security purposes, has been a fundamental tool for a 
variety of governmental purposes.  Three relevant functions of surveillance include “to anticipate 
a violation…to detect a violation…or to assist in the identification of the person responsible for a 
violation or in the authentication of an assertion as to the identity of a culprit.”144  Since the 
inception of GPS technology, advents in commerce and globalization have increasingly led to the 
proposition that the ability to collect data equates to having power.145  From a national defensive 
standpoint, the ability to collect data, in real time, provides invaluable tools for preempting 
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various threats.  The rise of the Department of Homeland Security as an indispensible 
governmental agency indicates the degree to which domestic safety plays in present times.  
National security, accordingly, has been expanded to include “intelligence gathering and 
warning, border and transportation security; domestic counter terrorism; protection of critical 
infrastructure; defending against outside attacks; and emergency preparedness and response.”146  
With the threat of terrorism looming and the limitedness o state resources, state police actors 
have turned to technological advents to combat an unknown, sophisticated enemy.147  
Officers, accordingly, rely on GPS technology to gather invaluable insight as to the 
present location of tracked suspects.148  Especially helpful to counterterrorism efforts is the 
ability to compose a location profile of monitored individuals.149  Profile formation, using GPS 
tracking, has proven to accurately model human behavior and provide private insight into 
people’s lives.150  In addition to successfully monitoring individuals, GPS tracking provides for a 
greater threat unearthing.   Terrorists often work in cells and GPS tracking of one suspected 
terrorist could easily unearth a network of terrorists with relatively few logistical costs. 151 
Requiring officers to obtain individual permission to GPS track would unduly burden law 
enforcement agents, decelerate terrorism prevention, and work to contradict the intent behind the 
Act’s promulgation.  Warrantless GPS tracking, therefore, is necessary to permit for an efficient, 
minimally invasive system to tracking that helps law enforcement agents quickly preempt 
terrorist threats.   
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The prevalence of national security as a governmental interest combined with the existing 
Patriot Act scheme; undoubtedly suffice the Berger test for a “special need” exception.  The 
realities of September 11 and the need to use technology for counterterrorism purposes highlight 
the fact that while privacy rights are important, we cannot divorce ourselves from present day 
reality.  The statutory leeway provided by the Patriot Act allows state law enforcement a right to 
choose the most effective tool for combating national threats. GPS tracking affords surveillance 
intelligence capabilities that optimize threat prevention with optimal resource utilization.    
iii. The Implications of GPS Tracking; When Leeway Turns to Abuse  
Opponents of GPS tracking have raised two main contentions to warrantless police 
surveillance practices.   Firstly, use of GPS tracking can easily yield abuse.  With no supervisory 
benchmarks, law enforcement agencies may opt to monitor any party, at any time, for an 
unrestricted period of time.  Failure to require warrants could translate to arbitrary and capricious 
application of GPS tracking.  Of special concern is the magnitude of many citizens’ vulnerability 
to the abuse of GPS monitoring given the prevalent use of motor vehicles in our society.152  From 
a policy standpoint, excessive government surveillance could exert a chilling “big brother” effect 
upon society.153  GPS tracking could, in essence, transition to a general warrant the Framers 
hoped to combat with the enactment of the Fourth Amendment.154    
These concerns have prompted the American Bar Association to issue standards for 
electronic and physical surveillance.  Specifically, the standards advise that “at the outset[…] 
technologically-assisted. . . surveillance should be regulated not only when it diminishes privacy, 
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but also when it diminishes ‘freedom of speech, association and travel, and the openness of 
society.’"155  Despite the legitimacy of these concerns, placing a warrant requirement on police 
tracking would be excessive.   Instead, internal regulation could provide sufficient safeguards 
without triggering strict constitutional protections.156    
Secondly, GPS tracking, by extension, could amount to police officers tracking 
individuals utilizing citizens’ own cellular devices.  While the United States Supreme Court has 
not certified this issue on appeal, commentators have expressed concern that permissive 
warrantless GPS tracking could transition to government access to cellular GPS location data.157 
Presently, there are more than 262 million cellular-phone subscribers in the United States. 158 
Cellular phones relay their location to phone towers to have the strongest possible signal and 
promote inbound calls from being interrupted. 159 This process is called “registration” and occurs 
every seven seconds automatically, without any user interaction.160   Cellular towers transmit and 
store this information for providers’ billing purposes.   Additionally, many cell phone devices are 
equipped with GPS chips that permit users to operate their phones as GPS devices.  Through 
triangulation, cell phone towers use cell phone signals to calculate the Time Difference of 
Arrivals and the Angle of Arrival to proximately locate a cell phone user’s location.161  
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Combined, these features are very desirable for law enforcement agencies that can use this 
information to determine a suspect’s approximate location and to track his or her movement.162 
Electronic surveillance is generally governed by the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1968 (hereinafter “ECPA”).163   Pursuant to the ECPA, law enforcement officers may 
obtain a court order that would require cellular service providers to turn over location tracking 
information.164  There is, however, a split among both the state courts and appellate circuit courts 
as to the legal standard required for obtaining prospective, real time information from third-party 
cellular providers.165  The standards depend on what aspect of the ECPA the courts believe is 
implicated.   Specifically, the Act is divided into three titles which courts have deconstructed to 
four categories of protection.  Firstly, Title I of the ECPA, which address the interception of 
wire, electronic, and oral communication, provides the most protection for cellular 
communication in forcing the government to meet “super warrant requirements” before the 
interception of conversation content.166  Secondly, Title II of the Act addresses the government’s 
burden of obtaining customer records which requires a “showing of specific and articulable facts 
regarding the government’s needs for the information.167  Thirdly, concerning authority required 
for use of a tracking device, the government must show probable cause.168  The final category 
involves the use of pen registers and “trap and trace” devices, which pursuant to Title III, 
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requires the government to simply demonstrate the material is relevant to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.169    
Given the breadth of ECPA interpretations, it is not surprising that courts varied on the 
legal standard necessary for the government to obtain cell-phone data from cellular providers.  
For example, the California Supreme Court has recently decided that police officers may obtain 
cell phone texting records without a warrant.170  The court reasoned that because the cell phone 
was “immediately associated with defendant’s person[,]” officers were entitled to inspect its 
content, without a warrant, regardless of whether an exigency existed.171  Conversely, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas recently decided that “[w]hen the 
government requests records from cellular providers, data disclosing the location of the 
telephone at the time of particular calls may be acquired only by a warrant issued on probable 
cause.”172  
A decision concerning warrantless GPS monitoring of suspects’ vehicles can have 
significant implications on the capability of officers to obtain cell phone record information.  
While GPS tracking and cell phone surveillance practices have many aspects in common, there 
are significant differences that would deter the Court from deciding the Maynard173 decision 
broadly.   In particular, cell phone records implicate a different expectation of privacy from a 
Katz174 reasonable assessment standpoint.   Cell phones generally enter into the home and could 
provide output information relating to a suspect’s presence and location within the home.   As 
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such, Kyllo175  is more heavily implicated in this context.   Moreover, cell phones have not been 
the subject of decisions that repeatedly discount the expectation of privacy citizens have in them 
like vehicles have.176  In fact, any decisions concerning cell phone data have been interpreted as 
outdated and superseded by the ECPA enactment.177   Cell phone data collection and record 
keeping, while physically entering into the public sphere, cannot be obtained through visual 
inspection.   Instead, steps beyond ordinary police practices must be undertaken for information 
gathering purposes.   The different privacy implications in the cellular context will likely sway 
the Court to side with a more stringent standard that would require officers to obtain warrants 
prior to seeking such records.  The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly reinforced its 
practice of deciding issues narrowly. 178  Given the above differences, the Court will likely limit 
its decision to the sole issue on the application of a GPS device to a suspect’s car and opt to 
disregard the implications this decision will have on cell phone tracking.    
IV. Conclusion  
It is undisputed that GPS tracking implicates citizens’ expectation of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Katz’s reasonableness assessment vindicates the right of people to be 
secure from governmental intrusion, even in highly susceptible areas such as a motor vehicle on 
a public highway, by requiring that subjective and objective reasonableness expectations be 
protected.  The right against privacy invasion, however, must be balanced with competing 
interests that erode the constitutional privilege in favor of greater social welfare.  While 
theoretically constitutional rights are not subject to legislative change, theory must often yields to 
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the pragmatics of reality.   In this context, the imposition of GPS surveillance is attenuated by the 
need to protect the United States from international and domestic threats.     
September 11, 2001 accentuated the present risks the United States is facing.  Especially 
alarming has been the revelation that national threats are not solely foreign and parties within the 
United States are working to cause severe harm to the country and its corresponding citizens.  To 
help mobilize counterterrorism, Congress enacted the Patriot Act to provide wide discretion for 
law enforcement agencies in their protection efforts.  Law enforcements were given the ability to 
suspend generally accepted constitutional disclosure requirement that follow searches.  
Additionally, state police agencies were permitted to conduct invasive surveillance efforts on any 
domestic suspect that the officers reasonably suspected could be a threat to the country.  The 
national interest embodied in the Patriot Act combined with the permissive rights it grants law 
enforcement officers can, therefore, permit the use of GPS tracking as a routine surveillance 
practice.  The benefits obtained from warrantless GPS tracking, especially, are unmatchable by 
any other reasonable means. In addition to providing real-time tracking,  that would require 
extraordinary financial means if replicated by police officers,  GPS data gathering amounts to an 
extremely revealing individual profile of a suspect that could unearth a network of other 
terroristic threats.  Accordingly, in relying on Berger’s two prong test, there is strong support to 
classify warrantless GPS tracking as a special needs exception to the warrant requirement.    
In granting certiorari on the Maynard case, the United States Supreme Court expressed an 
interest in resolving the present conflict that has developed since the Knotts decision. In 
ultimately deciding the case, the Court will signal its standpoint on technological advents and 
their implications on citizens’ reasonable expectation of privacy. In particular, the Court is 
forced to reconcile permissive surveillance tactics with the Kyllo decision where the Court pulled 
back on its permissive view on technological use for police purposes.  
Zealous opponents to warrantless GPS tracking emphasize that the decision could create 
dangerous precedent that would permit further Fourth Amendment erosion. In particular, 
warrantless GPS tracking could by extension permit law enforcement agencies to mandate third 
party cellular service providers to handover cell phone user’s location and movement history 
from their own device. Despite these concerns, the Supreme Court has established a policy of 
deciding decisions very narrowly and likely would not address this matter. Moreover, GPS 
tracking via a suspect’s own cellular device implicates different privacy interests and a separate 
body of legislative enactments and corresponding case law. As such, the decision will likely be 
sufficiently tailored to quail most opponents’ concerns.    
Given the need to protect the United States from terrorist threats, the Fourth Amendment 
cannot stonewall the use of technological advances. In face of unconventional warfare, the like 
presented with terrorism, warrantless GPS tracking could be the difference between allowing and 
preventing another attack on domestic soil.   The Fourth Amendment must succumb to a new 
understanding of what is socially reasonable and concede to an urgent governmental need.  
 
